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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CITIZEN'S CASUALTY 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GEORGE L. HACKETT, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Case No. 
10334 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent will set out a more detailed 
statement of the facts than has the Appellant, as 
the statement of facts by the Appellant is sketchy, 
and in some particulars inaccurate. 
The plaintiff, Citizens Casualty Company is 
an insurance company of the State of New York, 
writing public liability and property damage in-
surance on motor vehicles. The company was rep-
resented in Utah by George Hackett, the defendant, 
as an agent or broker. 
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George Hackett solicited insurance from Paul 
W. Nielson, d/b/a Nielson Trucking Company. On 
or about October 24, 1958, Nielson placed an order 
with Hackett for a policy of insurance for cover-
age of bodily injury liability and for property dam-
age. Hackett placed a telephone call to a Mr. Blum 
of Los Angeles who represented the Citizens Casu-
alty Company and requested him to contact the New 
York Office of the plaintiff and obtain liability 
and property damage cove1·age for the Nielson Com-
pany. On the same date, plaintiff sent a telegram 
to the defendant (Ex. P-14) stating that at the re-
quest of Blum, plaintiff would accept the risk and 
were "binding Nielson Trucking Company as of 
October 27, 1958 with Policy CGA 1103" and the 
telegram also stated that the Citizens Casualty Com-
pany, on that date, wired the Interstate Commerce 
Commissison and the Utah Public Service Commis-
sion to that effect. Copies of the telegram sent to 
the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Utah 
Public Service Commission are a part of Exhibits 
P-14. The telegram also stated that on Monday, 
October 27, 1958 the plaintiff would telegraph the 
regulatory bodies in the remaining states in which 
the Nielson Trucking Company was operating its 
trucks and inform the regulatory bodies of those 
states, that it was binding this risk. 
At about the same time Nielson requested cargo 
insurance from Hackett. Cargo insurance was placed 
by Hackett with the Firemen's Fund Insurance Com-
2 
pany (Ex. 7). The insurance coverage provided by 
that policy, MTR 11181, is "for loss or damage to 
lawful goods and merchandise while on vehicles 
operated by Nielson". The policy called for a pre-
mium rate of 60¢ per $100.00 of gross receipts. The 
liability and property damage coverage provided by 
the plaintiff was in effect from October 27, 1958 
to April 7, 1959. 
The premium rates on both policies was based 
on gross receipts of the Nielson Trucking Company 
in its trucking operations. Hackett obtained a pre-
mium deposit of $1000.00 cash and a promissory 
note for $4137.60 on December 4, 1958 (Ex. D-18) 
providing for monthly payments of $689.60. 
In order that the monthly premium could be 
computed, the Nielson Company made monthly re-
ports of its gross receipts beginning with the date 
October 25, 1958. A tabulation of the premiums 
developed on both the liability and property damage 
policy and the cargo insurance measured by these 
gross receipts appears in Exhibit P-13 and are as 
follows: 
October, 1958 
November, 1958 
December, 1958 
January, 1959 
February, 1959 
March, 1959 
Total 
$ 391.95 
1397.72 
1560.32 
1529.37 
2275.84 
777.50 
$6932.70 
In this Exhibit P-13, Hackett acknowledges that he 
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received these sums from Nielson to be applied to 
the two original policies, based on gross receipts. 
The cargo policy rate was 60¢ per $100.00 of gross 
receipts. The total gross receipts for the period 
October 25, 1958 to April 7, 1959 was $157,670.16 
(See adding machine tape attached to Ex. D-9) pro-
ducing a premium of $943.00 on the cargo insurance 
leaving premiums on the policy in question of the 
difference or $5989. 70. This premium belonged to 
the plaintiff but the defendant did not pay this 
over to the plaintiff. If the amounts had been paid 
over to the plaintiff, the plaintiff would have been 
obliged to pay the defendant a commission of 22 ;~ 
or $1317. 7 4. Allowing this commission to the def end-
an t, the defendant should have paid over to the 
plaintiff the net amount of $4671.96. Accordingly, 
the lower court entered a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff for the sum plus interest. 
'il,,> 
A notice of r.;>ncellation of the coverage of the 
plaintiff was sent on March 6, 1959 becoming ef-
fective on April 7, 1959 (Ex. P-16). Notice of this 
cancellation was sent to all of the regulatory agen-
cies to which binders had been sent and these are 
listed in this exhibit, being the Interstate Commerce 
Commission and the regulatory bodies of the states 
of Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, 
Oregon, Utah and Wyoming. 
We wish to direct the court's attention to some 
incorrect statements which Appellant has inter-
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spersed in his ai·gument. They are: 
1. That all monies received by defendant from 
Nielson were in fact ultimately applied on insurance 
coverage with companies other than the plaintiff. 
(Appellant's Brief - Page 24). 
2. That at the termination of Appellant's deal-
ings with the Nielson Trucking Company, the Ap-
pellant had in fact expended some $3,000.00 more 
on insurance coverage than Nielson paid for. (Ap-
pellant's Brief - Page 25). 
Each of these statements purporting to be facts, 
is incorrect. A correct statement of fact would be 
that all monies in excess of $5989. 70 were in fact 
utimately applied on insurance coverage with com-
panies other than the plaintiff. This will be dem-
onstrated in the discussion that follows. 
Appellant's counsel states that it is a fact that 
"at the termination of defendant's dealing with 
Nielson Trucking Company, defendant had in fact 
expended some $3,000.00 more on insurance cover-
age than Nielson paid and was compelled to file a 
claim for said amount with the Receiver of Nielson 
Trucking Company". (Appellant's Brief - - Page 
25). That statement is in essence a repitition of the 
statement made by Appellant in his Brief at Page 5, 
as follows: "Nielson Trucking Company in 1960 
went into involuntary receivership and Exhibit P-12 
which constitutes a running ledger of Nielson's 
truck account with George L. Hackett & Company, 
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shows a balance due and owing by Nielson in the 
amount of $3285. 75 for which defendant made a 
claim in the Receivership (Exhibit P-12)". (Appel-
lant's Brief, Page 5). The fact is that Hackett's 
claim against Nielson was for only $363.08. This 
overcharge results from the fact that when Hackett 
filed his claim in the Receivership Proceedings, he 
made a charge of $2922.67 that should not have 
been made. This is evident from on inspection of 
the last entry on Page 1 of Exhibit P-12 which 
reads: "4-7-59, Reference 2197, Gross Receipts de-
posit premium $2922.67". On that date, namely, 
April 7, 1959 the Citizens Casualty policy was can-
celled and Mr. Hackett replaced that policy with one 
issued by another company. He then charged the 
monthly premiums on the account as they accrued. 
Since the premiums during the entire period when 
the policy was in force have been charged as debits 
on Page 1 of Exhibit 13, it is improper to add the 
deposit premium of $2922.67 as a charge. This 
results in the overcharge of the sum of $2922.67. 
Thus, the total charged to Nielson should be 
reduced by $2922.67 making the correct figure for 
total charges $17,023.32 and the total payments by 
Nielson were $16,660.24 leaving Nielson owing 
Hackett just $363.08. 
The facts then are that Hackett was paid his 
entire premium charges down to the last charge 
of $1110.02 that accrued for the month of Novem-
ber 1959 on the successor liability and property 
' 
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dama.ge policy and Hackett even received $746.94 
to be applied against that final charge, leaving only 
an outstanding balance due to him of $363.08. 
ARGUMENT 
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S POINT 1-A 
Appellant in his Point I argues that his Motion 
to Dismiss should have been granted (a) on the 
grounds of res judicata. The basis of the Motion 
was that a judgment had been entered in a case 
entitled Citizens Casiialty Cornpany v. Keith J. 
Coons ancl George Hackett, # 127263 in the Third 
District Court and that judgment was an adjudica-
tion of the issues in this case. In that case plaintiff 
sued Keith J. Coons for the premiums on a policy 
of insurance written through the defendant Hack-
ett's Agency, on Policy Form 380C-3-58. The defend-
ant Coons, had pleaded that he had paid Hackett 
and that was the reason for joining him as a party 
defendant in that suit. A judgment was entered in 
favor of Coons on finding being made that he had 
paid Hackett. The court made a finding in that 
case that there was no evidence of an insurance 
binder having been issued by the plaintiff and the 
court's conclusion of law was that no contract of 
insurance ever becrine effective and plaintiff was, 
therefore, not entitled to collect the premium. (Page 
9 of Appellant's Brief) In this case the court made 
a finding that: "The plaintiff wired the defendant 
that it was binding the Nielson Trucking Company" 
( R-11). The facts in the two cases are different. In 
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the Coons case the finding was that the1·e was no 
policy of insurance - in the instant case that there 
was an effective binder. 
In the Coons case, plaintiff made a Motion for 
a new trial which has never been disposed of. Ac-
cordingly, there is no final judgment in the Coons 
case which may be used as evidence for the purpose 
of establishing a plea of res judicata. See Sweetsa 
v. Fox, 43 Utah 40, 134 P. 599 at 6021 -
It has accordingly repeatedly been held in that 
state that a judgment roll may not be used 
as evidence for the purpose of establishing 
pleas of estoppel or res judicata pending an 
appeal or during the time an appeal can be 
taken. The correctness of that doctrine may 
be conceded, and yet it in no way militates 
against the fact that a judgment may never-
theless be used as evidence for some purpose 
othe1· than estoppel and res judicata. The 
reason why a judgment roll pending an ap-
peal or during the time when one may be tak-
en may not be used as evidence of an estop-
pel or res judicato of any particular fact or 
facts involved in the litigation which termin-
ated in the judgment evidenced by the judg-
ment roll is palpably obvious. So long as the 
judgment may be modified or reversed UJ.?OD 
a direct proceeding on appeal 01· otherw~se, 
the facts that were involved in the litigat10n 
cannot be said to be res judicata. That is, they 
are not finally fixed and determined, but are 
still subject to be changed or entirely over-
thrown. 
This is a complete Answer to Appellant's Point 
1-(A). 
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1-B - Appellant quotes Section 31-19-9 ( 1) 
UCA 53 evidently contending that if a policy of 
insurance is written on a policy form which has 
not been approved by the Insurance Commissioner, 
that an insurance company cannot collect the pre-
miums from the insured. This case is not a suit by 
an insurance company to recover a premium from 
its insured. The insured paid the premium to Hack-
ett, the defendant, who, instead of paying it over 
to the insurance company, kept the premium as his 
own and the insurance company is here only asking 
for the insurance premium which the agent, Hackett, 
has kept as his own. Before proceeding to a state-
ment of the law on this point, we quote the conclud-
ing sub-division of this section of the Statute: 
Sub-Division 5 - The Commissioner may, by 
01·der, exempt from the requirements of this 
section, for so long as he deems proper, any 
insurance document or form or type thereof 
as specified in such order to which in his opi-
nion this section may not practicably be ap-
plied or the filing and approval of which are, 
in his opinion, not desirable or necessary for 
the protection of the public. 
We quote this section only to show that no great 
significance is attached to this particular require-
ment of the insurance code. 
If this case were one for the recovery of a pre-
mium from the insured, the failure to file a form 
with the Insurance Commissioner would not bar 
the insurance company's right to recover. See Ross 
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v. Producers Mutual Insurance Conipany, 4 Utah 
2d, 396, 295 P. 2cl, 339. This court has held that 
even though there be sanctions imposed for a viola-
tion of the insurance code, Section 31-1-6 UCA 53 
nevertheless holds the violation of the statute does 
not void the contract of insurance. The court at 
Page 3421 of 295 P. 2d, states: 
Williston concludes that no agrement should 
be held void in toto unless no other result is 
possible from the words of the statute. Other-
wise, blind and unreasoning forfeitures would 
result in depriving one party of his entire 
investment, or effort in performance, because 
of some technical violation of statute, and re-
ward the other, perhaps equally guilty party 
with an undeserved and unearned benefit. 
This probably explains the actual attitude of 
the court which have considered various as-
pects of contracts which violate some statu-
tory provision. Originally a distinction was 
often drawn between statutes that were rnal-
um in se (contracts violating such statutes 
were void); and those which were malum pro-
hibitum (such contracts were not void); but 
it is now recognized that whether a malum 
prohibitum contract is void is to be deter-
mined from an examination of the statute 
as a whole. Among the factors to be weighe~ 
are whether the enactment was passed pri-
marily as a revenue measure or whether it was 
a policing measure, and whether the statute 
contains an express provision making the con-
tract void. But the primary consideration, of 
course, is what does the statute construed as 
a whole indicate? 
"Turning to our statute, we think it is appar-
10 
ent that our Legislature intended to make 
C?ntracts of insurance valid wherever pos-
sible. For example Section 31-19-35, UCA 
53 reads: 
"~ny ins~rance policy, * * * * * other-
wise, vahd, which contains any condi-
tion or provision not in compliance with 
the requirements of this code, shall not 
be rendered invalid thereby, but shall be 
construed and applied in accordance with 
such conditions and provisions as would 
have applied had such policy, rider, or 
endorsement been in full compliance with 
this code." 
See also Kidder v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity 
Company, 126 Wash. 475, 219 P. 220 at 221: 
The appellant contends that under the Insur-
ance Code of this state all insurance com-
panies dealing in accident insurance were re-
quired to file with the insurance commission-
er rate schedules or a manual of risks and a 
copy of its form of policy that it had com-
plied with the law, and that it could not obli-
gate itself except upon the issuance of a writ-
ten policy at the rate filed. In the case of Way 
v. Pacific Lumber & Timber Co., 74 Wash. 
332, 133 P. 595, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 147, there 
was called in question the provisions of the 
Insurance Code making it unlawful to sell in-
surance at less than the scheduled rate. It 
was held in that case that error lies in the 
assumption that the contract between the 
agent and the insured was void, whereas the 
rule is that a contract which violates a statu-
tory regulation of itself is not void unless 
made so by the terms of the act. 
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We quote from the Kidder case because there ref er-
ence is made to the particular alleged violation of 
the code, namely the failure to file a copy of the 
form of the policy. The Utah Insurance Code does 
not treat the failure to have a policy form approved 
a serious violation. In fact, the authority of the 
Commissioner to di~pprove a form is strictly limit-
ed by the provisions of 31-19-10 which reads: 
31-19-10 - Restrictions upon right of com-
missioner to disapprove form. The commis-
sioner shall disapprove any such form of in-
surance policy, application, rider or endorse-
ment, or withdraw any previous approval 
thereof, only 
( 1) if it is in any respect in violation of or 
does not comply with this code; or 
(2) if it does not comply with any controll-
ing filing theretofore made and approved; or 
( 3) if it contains or incorporates by refer-
ence any inconsistent, ambiguous or mislead-
ing clauses, or exceptions and conditions which 
unreasonably or deceptively affect the risk 
purported to be assumed in the general cover-
age of the contract; or 
( 4) if it has any title, heading, or other in-
dication of its provisions which is likely to 
mislead; or 
( 5) if purchase of insurance thereunder is 
being solicited by deceptive advertising. 
Appellant concludes the discussion of Point 1-B 
by referring to an allegation in plaintiff's complaint 
which states "that the Utah Commissioner of Insur-
12 
ance did not recognize the authority of the defend-
ant Hackett to countersign policies on behalf of the 
plaintiff, but nevertheless, the plaintiff was bound 
to provide the coverage even though the defendant 
Hackett was not authorized to countersign policies." 
The only material part of that allegation is that 
the policy did provide insurance coverage to Nielson. 
That allegation cannot be tortured into an allega-
tion or admission that the plaintiff insurance com-
pany did not have a certificate of authority to do 
business in Utah. The allegation that the plaintiff 
had such authority was pleaded (R-1) and not de-
nied and it was not made an issue by the Pretrial 
Order. ( R. 5) Appellant's entire discussion under 
Point 1-B appears to be foreign to the issues in 
this case. 
DISCUSSION OF APPELLANT'S POINT 2 "THAT NO 
CONTRACT OF INSURANCE WAS EVER CONSUM-
MATED GIVING RISE TO A CAUSE OF ACTION." 
In our discussion under Point 1-(a) we have 
already stated that the court in the instant case 
made a finding that the insurance policy in question 
became binding. Appellant in his argument on this 
point in his Brief sets out approximately five pages 
of testimony which he no doubt considers as estab-
lishing that no contract of insurance was ever con-
summated. It is Respondent's view that none of the 
testimony is germane to the question as to whether 
a policy of insurance became effective with the ex-
13 
ception of the following evidence quoted by the de-
fendant on Page 16: 
"No, I didn't issue the binders. They would 
happen, Mr. Arnovitz. I flew to Los Angeles 
and met with their general agent on 1-24-58. 
Mr. Blum and in a three-way conversation 
between him and with myself listening on the 
line to Mr. R. M. Bishop at the home office 
in New York. Mr. Bishop as a result of that 
telephone call, which I paid for, and the re-
ceipt of which is right here, caused a wire to 
be sent to our office in Salt Lake City, saying 
that they would bind the coverage pending re-
ceipt of the completed signed application on 
the part of Nielson Trucking Co. for their 
review and consideration." 
The last sentence of that testimony is interesting in 
that the defendant is there evidently trying to estab-
lish that the binder would be effective only "pending 
receipt of the completed signed application on the 
part of Nielson Trucking Company for their re-
view and consideration". We include herewith the 
testimony of the defendant which preceded that 
statement and which followed it. 
BY MR. ARN OVITZ: 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
State your name please? 
George L. Hackett. 
And are you the defendant in this action? 
I am. 
Were you engaged in the i~surance b~si­
ness as broker or agent durmg the period 
October i, 1958 to April 30th, 1959? 
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
Under what name? 
G. L. Hackett & Company. 
In connection with the operation of that 
business did you have occasion to con-
tact Mr. Paul Nielson with respect to 
writing insurance for him? 
I did. 
When did you first contact him? 
Some part of the first, around the first 
part of October, 1958? 
And did you as a result of that conver-
sation do anything about issuing binders 
on public liability and property damage 
on his fleet of trucks? 
I did. 
To whom did you issue the binders? 
Nielson Trucking Co. 
And to whom were the binders delivered? 
There was a binder delivered to Nielson 
Trucking Company and to certain states 
in which the Nielson Trucking Company 
operated. 
Had you caused those binders to be de-
livered? 
I did. 
And in that connection did you contact 
the Citizens Casualty Co. of New York, 
the plaintiff in this action? 
Contacting their general agent, Mr. Rob-
ert Blum. 
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Q. And after contacting him did you receive 
any communications like a telegram or 
letter from Citizens Casualty Company 
of New York? 
A. I did. 
Q. \Vill you produce those communications? 
A. Yes. 
Your Honor, I must have that in another file. 
MR. MADSEN HERE, 
A. Thanks. No, I didn't issue the binders. 
They would happen, Mr. Arnovitz. I flew 
to Los Angeles and met with their gen-
eral agent on 10-24-58. Mr. Blum and 
in a three-way conversation between him 
and wiith myself listening on the line to 
Mr. R. M. Bishop at the home office in 
New York, Mr. Bishop as a result of that 
telephone call, which I paid for, and the 
receipt of which is right here, caused a 
wire to be sent to our office in Salt Lake 
City, saying that they would bind the 
coverage pending receipt of the completed 
signed application on the part of Nielson 
Trucking Co. for their review and con-
sideration. 
Q. I see. And did you send in that applica-
tion? 
Q. Let me look at that? 
A. I don't know if that's it. Let me look at 
that and see if that is part of the file 
here. I think it might be. Let's see. It 
isn't here. This is the telephone call here. 
It must be here. 
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Q. Let me ask you another question. 
A. That application, Mr. Arnovitz, was sent 
New York and I don't know if I ever 
got it back. I do not find it in the file. 
Q. And after that application went in and 
binders had been sent, then what did you 
do about collecting premiums on that 
policy? 
A. I didn't do anything about collecting pre-
miums on that policy because the com-
pany had not advised us that their rate 
would be, but on deposit of the rate that 
we had with Nielson pending receipt of 
the premium to be charged by company, 
we waited for their information on what 
those rates would be and receipt of a 
policy. They had to formulate the rates 
in New York. I had nothing to do with 
that. 
The defendant was not able to produce the al-
leged applications in response to counsel's demand 
nor did he present from his files the telegram which 
constituted the binder. Counsel for the Respondent 
sometime later in the examination again inquired 
whether Hackett could produce the telegrams and 
Hackett stated that he had not been able to find 
them but would continue to hunt them. Counsel for 
Respondent then produced copies of the telegram 
and Appellant acknowledged that Exhibit 14 was 
a copy of the telegram binding this insurance. Niel-
son testified ( R-42) that after these telegrams were 
sent that he operated in the various states without 
any further requests for these states for him to post 
17 
evidence of liability and property damage insurance. 
In response to a question placed by the court as to 
whether this binder telegram satisfied the regula-
tory bodies in the states in which the trucking com-
pany operated, Nielson answered ( R-42) "it must 
have done, otherwise, we would have notification. 
The minute you are without insurance they usually 
let you know 30 days before hand so that if you 
are out of insurance you had better replace it or 
quit running". 
We have already quoted another interesting 
part of the defendant's testimony which he offered 
evidently to show that there was no policy in effect 
and he stated: "I didn't do anything about collect-
ing premiums on that policy, because the company 
had not advised us what that rate would be - - - - ''. 
( R-96) He made this statement after there had been 
introduced in evidence checks showing payment to 
him of over $9,000.00 in premiums on this policy. 
The rest of the testimony quoted by Appellant's 
Counsel to support the proposition that no policy of 
insurance was ever consummated is actually testi-
mony regarding the determination of the amount 
of the premium and the collection of the premium. 
It all appears immaterial in the light of the positive 
fact that Hackett collected over $9,000.00 on that 
insurance policy which his counsel now argues did 
not become effective. 
It is hardly necessary to comment upon the 
authority cited by counsel to support the proposi-
18 
tion that no insurance contract was consummated 
other than to refer to the quoted portion of the auth-
orities cited. The quotation from 29 Am. Jur. 587 
at Section 196 simply states that there could not be 
a contract of insurance without an acceptance, a 
legal truism. Here the evidence is clear that there 
was a binder and that Nielson accepted the policy. 
We respectfully submit that a contract of in-
surance was consummated. 
REPLY TO POINT 3 OF APPELLANT'S 
ARGUMENT 
There never was any issue in this case as to 
whether any claims had been made under this policy 
of insurance. A premium is due and payable when 
a policy is effective regardless of whether a claim 
is made under the policy. We see no materiality of 
that discussion at Page 23 of Appellant's Brief. 
Likewise, there is no issuance here as to the refund 
of the premiums to the insured. 
The remainder of Point 3 is not at all germane 
to the headnote. We have already replied to that 
part of Point 3 which appears on Pages 24, 25 and 
26 of Appellant's Brief (Pages 5-7). In the final 
paragraph, counsel for the Appellants makes a gra-
tuitous statement on an issue which was not con-
sidered in the case at all, namely as to whether 
Hackett would have had liability personally. The 
reason it could not have been an issue is because 
the plaintiff at all times recognized that it had 
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the liability of an insurer under this policy. Respon-
dent's Counsel respectfully submits that he is un-
able to see how the fact that no claim was ever made 
under this policy or the fact that Nielson did not 
request Hackett to refund to him the more than 
$9000.00 he paid to Hackett can effect the issue 
in this case. 
Appellant, under Point 3, challenges the Find-
mg of Fact which determines the amount of the 
judgment in plaintiff's favor. 
The Appellant's Brief at Page 26 claims 
that this amount due to the plaintiff was "arrived 
at by inference" but makes no effort to establish 
that the finding of the court as to the amount due 
to plaintiff is in any way erroneous. 
Appellant there seeks to convey the impression 
that the record does not support the findings as to 
the amount of the premiums that defendant collected 
on the policy in question. The court made a finding 
that the defendant collected total premiums of 
$5989. 70 on this policy. The fact is that the defend-
ant Hackett collected a greater sum as premiums 
on the policy of the Citizens Casualty Company than 
the amount stated in the Findings of Fact. (Ex. P-1) 
This is shown by a group of checks paid by Nielson 
to Hackett totalling $9224.06 to be applied to the 
policy in question and to the cargo policy of the 
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Firemen's Fund. These payments and their dates 
follow: 
October 3, 1958 -
Deposit Premium 
December 23, 1958 
December 23, 1958 
January 9, 1959 
January 10, 1959 
January 10, 1959 
March 15, 1959 
March 31, 1959 
May 1, 1959 
Total 
$1000.00 
689.60 
391.95 
689.63 
689.63 
1397.72 
1560.32 
1529.37 
1275.84 
$9224.06 
Since this sum of $9224.06 was the total of the pre-
mi urns paid on both the policy in question and the 
cargo policy issued by Firemen's Fund, it is a simple 
arithmetical calculation to deduct the amount of 
the premiums paid on the cargo policy to arrive at 
the amount paid on the policy in question. Exhibit 
P-3, P-6 and D-7 show the original premium rate 
on the Cargo policy at 50¢ per $100.00 of gross re-
ceipts. An endorsement added to Exhibit D-7 in-
creases the rate to 60¢ per $100.00 of gross receipts, 
Exhibit D-9 which is summarized on the adding 
machine tape attached thereto shows the gross re-
ceipts during the period October 25, 1958 to April 
1, 1959 to be $157,607.15. The 60¢ rate, therefore, 
required the payment of $943.00 as the premium 
on the cargo policy leaving $8281.06 as the premium 
actually collected on this policy. The court made a 
finding that $5989. 70 was collected on this policy. 
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This difference of $2291.36 between the facts as 
just stated and the findings as made by the court, 
is that at the Trial the Respondent did not take the 
position that the deposit premium of $3068.86 was 
to be applied as against this policy but instead took 
the position that only $777.50 of that amount, on 
deposit, or enough to cover the March premium, 
should be considered as having been paid on the 
Citizens Casualty policy ( R-10). The difference be-
tween these figures is as just stated, exactly 
$2291.36. This demonstrates that not only is the 
finding amply supported but the court could have 
well made a finding that the defendant was charge-
able with collecting $2291.36 more than he was 
held liable for. We did not urge the court to charge 
the defendant with this greater sum although the 
court did make a finding (P-12) "That Nielson 
Trucking Company paid the defendant, George 
Hackett, a sum greater than $5289. 70 as owing for 
the premiums on this policy of liability insurance." 
The reason for our solicitude toward Hackett at 
the time of the Trial for not requesting a judgment 
for all of the monies he had received as premiums 
on the Citizens Casualty policy was because Hackett 
had not collected the full premium on the other policy 
which supplanted the Citizens Casualty policy. That 
successor liability and property damage policy was 
written by Central Casualty after Citizens Casualty 
cancelled. 
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DISCUSSION OF APPELLANT'S POINT 4 
Appellant quotes Section 31-19-21 (2) UCA 
53 as authority for his conclusions that this binder 
was invalid because no policy was delivered within 
150 days. This section provides that the binder shall 
be valid for 150 days from the effective date. The 
statute is evidently a recognition of the fact that 
at times it may be difficult to issue the policy before 
the expiration of 150 days. To provide for such con-
tingency, sub-division 3 of Section 31-19-31 UCA 
53 provides: 
( 3) If the policy has not been issued a binder 
may be extended or renewed beyond such 150 
days upon the commissioner's written approv-
al, or in accordance with such rules and regu-
lati'ons relative thereto as the commissioner 
may promulgate. 
On March 6, 1959, some 21 days before the expira-
tion of the 150 day period, the plaintiff sent Nielson 
Trucking Company a Notice of Cancellation. Niel-
son testified that the cancellation could not become 
effective for a period of 30 days because the regu-
latory bodies of the states required a Notice of 30 
days and therefore, it would have been futile to 
issue a policy at that point since the Notice of Can-
cellation had already been sent out on March 6, 1959. 
Clearly the binder was effective and was considered 
effective both by the insurance company and by 
the insured. 
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POINT 5 
PLAINTIFF FULLY MET ITS BURDEN OF 
PROOF 
Defendant complains that the plaintiff did not 
meet its burden of proving the facts necessary to 
establish a claim against the defendant. The evi-
dence abundantly establishes that the plaintiff pro-
vided bodily injury liability and property damage 
insurance to the Nielson Trucking Company; that 
a binder was issued and accepted by the Nielson 
Trucking Company; that the Nielson Trucking 
Company acknowledged that it had the benefit of 
this coverage; that Nielson paid Hackett for the 
coverage in an amount in excess of the judgment; 
that Hackett received the premiums and failed to 
pay the premiums over to the plaintiff. Proof of 
those facts provide all of the elements necessary to 
establish a cause of action and to sustain the judg-
ment. 
Plaintiff pleaded in Paragraph 1 of its Com-
plaint that "Plaintiff is an insurance corporation 
of the State of New York and has a Certificate of 
Authority from the State of Utah" (R-1) and de-
fendant admitted the allegations of Paragraph 1 of 
the complaint although he did allege a conclusion 
of law that the certificate was not valid. The Certi-
ficate of Authority stated that the plaintiff had 
authority to do business in the State of Utah. The 
court recited in the Findings - "That the Pretrial 
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Order did not make any issue as to plaintiff's auth-
ority to transact business in the State of Utah". 
The Appellant did not object to the Pretrial 
Order which was served on Mr. Madsen, counsel 
for the Appellant, and that Pretrial Order set forth 
that "The sole issue is whether or not defendant 
has misappropriated monies to which the plaintiff 
claims it is entitled to". Appellant misstates the 
record when he states: "As also indicated hereto-
fore, the undersigned, at the outset of the trial re-
f erred to the inconsistency of said Pretrial Order 
and moved that the issues of fact be broadened suf-
ficiently to include those raised by the pleadings 
(Appellant's Brief - Page 28). Counsel's reference 
is to Page 2 of his Brief where he stated: ''Counsel 
for defendant also, at that time, made reference to 
the Pretrial Order which reference is in part re-
ported but not in its entirety ( R-32). We can agree 
with counsel's later statement that he made ref e1'-
ence to the Pretrial Order but that reference at the 
Trial was simply the following statement by coun-
sel for the Appellant: "We would like to make a 
Motion that the court take judicial notice of the 
proceedings held in this case, the Pre-trial that was 
held in Judge Hansen's Office and other matters". 
(R-32) Thus, it appears that counsel did not request 
the Court to amend the Pretrial Order to include 
other issues than the single issue set up in the order. 
The only Motion made by Appellant's Counsel 
was to consolidate three cases for Trial ( R-32 Line 
10) 
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"Mr. Madsen's Testimony: - I am asking the 
court to take judicial notice of the record of this 
same court. I think that this case and the two com-
panion cases # 127044 and # 127263 should be tried 
together. I am sure it would be correct for the court 
to try these cases at one time". 
The final paragraph of Appellant's Point 5 
complains: "There is no evidence of any dealings 
by the plaintiff with the State Insurance Commis-
sioner". Having dealings with the Insurance Com-
missi'oner is not a prerequisite to recovery by the 
plaintiff of monies belonging to the plaintiff and 
misappropriated by the defendant. As either an ! 
agent, solicitor or broker, one of which the defend-
ant certainly was, he is guilty of larceny by em-
bezzlement when, "not being lawfully entitled there-
to, he appropriated such funds or any portion there-
of to his own use". Section 31-17-22 (3) UCA 53. 
Subdivision 2 of the same Section requires that all 
funds representing premiums received by an agent 
shall be held by him in his fiduciary capacity and 
shall be promptly accounted for and paid to the 
company, just as it requires that return premiums 
shall be held in his fiduciary capacity and returned 
to the insured. 
We respectfully submit that the plaintiff has 
met the burden of proof as abundantly appears from 
the transcript of evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
We regret that the inaccuracy with respect to 
the Statement of Facts in the Appellant's Brief has 
required us to lengthen the Statement of Fact. The 
facts all boil down to this: That the plaintiff insur-
ance company issued its policy of insurance to the 
Nielson Trucking Company through the George 
Hackett Insurance Agency; that the policy provided 
coverage to the Nielson Trucking Company for a 
given period of time; that an insurance premium 
of $5989. 70 accrued on this policy; that George L. 
Hackett, the agent, collected an amount in excess 
of $5989. 70 as insurance premiums on this policy; 
that he did not remit the insurance premium to the 
Citizens Casualty Company; that the Citizens casu-
alty Company is entitled to that sum of $5989.70 
less a commission earned by Hackett of $1317.7 4 or 
a net sum of $4671.96. 
We respectfully submit that there is no reason 
in law why Hackett should not be obliged to remit 
the sum of $4671.96 to the Citizens Casualty Com-
pany and that the judgment of the Lower Court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
IRWIN ARNOVITZ 
WHITE, ARNOVITZ & SMITH 
913 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for 
Plain ti/ f and Respondent 
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